From 1864 to 1972, the real price of oil fell by, on average, over one percent per year. This trend dramatically broke when prices for crude increased by over 650 percent from 1972 to 1980. Policy makers adopted several policies designed to keep oil prices in check and reduce consumption. Missing from these policies were taxes on either oil or gasoline, prompting a long economics literature documenting the inefficiencies of these alternative policies. In this paper, I review the policy discussion related to the transportation sector that occurred during the time through the lens of the printed press. In doing so, I pay particular attention to whether gasoline taxes were "on the table," as well as how consumers viewed the inefficient set of policies that were ultimately adopted. The discussions at the time suggest that meaningful changes in gasoline taxes were on the table; the public discussion seemed to be much greater than it is today. Some in Congress and many presidential advisors in the Nixon, Ford, and, Carter administrations supported and proposed gasoline taxes. The main roadblocks for taxes were Congress and the American people. Polling evidence at the time suggests that consumers preferred price controls and rationing and vehicle taxes over higher gasoline taxes or letting gasoline prices clear the market. Given the saliency of rationing and vehicle taxes, it seems difficult to argue that these alternative polices were adopted because they hide their true costs.
Introduction
By the end of 1972, things were great for oil. Prices were on a steady downward trend, falling on average by over one percent per year from 1861 to 1972; coal was giving way to oil as a fuel for electricity generation; and, vehicle ownership was expanding. Expenditures on oil imports exceeded two percent of GDP.
Prices stabilized at these higher levels until 1979 when a second oil shock occurred in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Protests in Iran hampered oil production and led to the suspension of Iranian oil exports. With Iranian production accounting for roughly ten percent of world oil production, these disruptions had a large effect on prices. This was followed by the Iran-Iraq War which lowered production in both countries. States is dependent on the two-third to three-fourths of the world oil supply (in Middle East countries) we would be hard-pressed to resist their ultimatum that we keep hands off Israel?
1 Not coincidentally, OPEC was formed in 1960.
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.8 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 October of 1972, James Atkins, a State Department's oil expert, said: "We believe that the first priority of the United States is to limit its increasing reliance on imported supplies of oil...We believe that the foreign policy pitfalls of an excessive reliance on important energy are too serious to risk." 3 Indeed, the 1973 embargo was not the first embargo. In June of 1967 several Middle-East countries limited shipments to the US and UK, but only Syria stopped all oil exports. Given the low cost of shipping oil, these actions had little influence on oil prices.
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It isn't completely clear that policy makers needed to react to the oil crises; the public debate typically was not couched in terms of market failures such as externalities. But, given the reliance of the US economy on oil consumption, one could argue that consumers did not Figure 4 : Share of electricity generation coming from oil internalize the costs of oil consumption associated with its affect on macroeconomic activity and energy security.
4 There was little question that policy makers felt a need to react.
The first response from these events was to strengthen price controls on oil, prompting the need for rationing rules, but long gasoline lines and shortages still occurred. The speed limit on highways was reduced to 55 miles per hour. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards and Gas Guzzler taxes were subsequently adopted. To the chagrin of economists, absent from these policies was a gasoline tax. Indeed, price controls on both oil and gasoline pushed prices below equilibrium levels. The reliance on alternatives to Pigouvian taxes led to a long literature in economics estimating the inefficiencies of these alternative policies. (See, for example, Fischer, Harrington and Parry (1982) , Jacobsen (2011 ), Holland, Hughes and Knittel (2009 ), Holland et al. (2010 .)
In this paper, I review the policies adopted as a response to the shocks. Next, I compare fuel consumption in the US with a large set of countries both before and after the shocks.
Finally, I review the policy discussion related to the transportation sector that occurred during 4 Tait and Morgan (1980 ) raised this in 1980 . See, Knittel (2012 for a more recent discussion of this. 
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Iraq Kuwait SA UAE Figure 5 : Oil production for the top-five oil producing states in the Middle East the time through the lens of the printed press and polling. In doing so, I pay particular attention to whether gasoline taxes were "on the table," as well as how consumers reacted to the inefficient set of policies ultimately adopted.
Discussions at the time suggest that meaningful changes in gasoline taxes as a way to reduce consumption were on the table; the public discussion seemed to be much greater than it is today. This is despite the fact that price controls were clearly working against such taxes.
Some in Congress and many presidential advisors in the Nixon, Ford, and, Carter administrations supported and proposed gasoline taxes. Presidents Nixon and Carter supported higher gasoline taxes, while President Ford did not. However, Ford was a staunch advocate of decontrolling oil prices and therefore understood the incentives that higher prices would bring.
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The main roadblocks for taxes were Congress and the American people. Polling evidence at the time suggests that consumers preferred price controls and rationing over higher gasoline taxes. They also preferred taxes on low-fuel-economy vehicles over increases in gasoline prices.
Given the saliency of the costs associated with rationing gasoline consumption, namely, the 5 However, Ford most often stressed the supply response of decontrolling prices.
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Outlays as a share of GDP 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Oil Outlay Share Import Oil Outlay Share Figure 6 : National petroleum outlays as share of GDP potential for queueing, it seems difficult to argue that these alternative polices were adopted because they hide their true costs. This would seem to suggest one of two possibilities, or a combination of the two: (1) we tend to overstate the value of people's time for activities such as refueling, and (2) concerns about the regressivity of policies such as gasoline taxes outweigh their efficiency gain. 
Policy responses
The US enacted a variety of policies designed to reduce consumption and limit price impacts.
The discussion at the time centered around a desire for policy makers to keep oil and gasoline expenditures down and to limit "windfall" profits for domestic oil companies. In this section, I discuss the policies adopted. prompted Nixon to lift import controls for Canadian oil.
The imposition of price controls, and their popularity, in 1971 likely laid the groundwork for the policies adopted during the oil crises and policy makers' resistance to taxes. While firms and labor unions tended to oppose price (and wage) controls, they appeared to be popular among consumers (and even some academic economists). 7 A Harris poll in early 1972 found that respondents, by a 53 to 23 margin, believed Nixon's price controls were doing "more good than harm." 8 In fact, the description of the poll results point to concerns among respondents that Nixon was being too flexible on prices. The time series of approval ratings for Nixon's economic policies also points to the popularity of his price control policies. Table 1 shows a time series of a Harris poll asking: "Do you feel the economic policies of the Nixon Administration are doing more good than harm or more harm than good?" Nixon's approval rating jump up right when price controls were adopted and hovered near 50 percent, while tended to hover around 30 percent prior to the controls. The Act also extended price controls for refined products. The two-tiered pricing structure created large rent transfers.
Those refineries that had access to old oil were more profitable than those relying on imports or new oil. In response to this, "old oil entitlements" were issued beginning in 1974 to equate the benefits, more or less, of old oil across refineries. To do this, refineries that used more old oil had to buy entitlements from refineries that consumed more imported oil.
Shortages in 1974 led to a nation-wide odd-even rationing program. Vehicles with license plates ending in an odd number could purchase gas on odd days; those with even-numbered license plates could purchase fuel on even days. To even out access, everyone could purchase 9 For a description, see for example, Mieczkowski (2005) .
gasoline on the 31st. Given the infrequency in which vehicles refuel, it isn't clear whether odd-even rationing reduced consumption. increasing gasoline prices independent of the change in crude prices.
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Pressure from the Department of Energy (DOE) and the announcement that price controls would be relaxed during 1979 may have exacerbated shortages. Verleger (1979) documents that while the DOE called on refineries to build up inventories of gasoline at the beginning of the year, they also called on refineries to build up inventories of distillate fuels in April, leading to more crude oil being used to make fuel for winter heating. In addition, the price control system may have led to an incentive to withhold gasoline, at least on the margin. The price of gasoline was based on the previous month's crude acquisition costs. Depending on a refinery's expectations about the price path of oil, this could have created an incentive to store gasoline for the next month. Furthermore, because the phasing out of price controls was announced, there was an addition incentive to withhold until prices were free to adjust.
The effect of phasing out price controls on US production is unclear, but there is some evidence that production increased. 
Demand-side policies
One of the first policies adopted to reduce consumption was a reduction in the speed limit to Congress (and the Ford administration) initially considered taxes on "gas guzzlers." Initial values for the gas guzzler tax would have placed a tax of $1,000 on cars with fuel economy below 13 miles per gallon. This was voted down by a 235 to 166 margin.
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The standards under CAFE were viewed as much weaker than the proposed gas guzzler taxes and were "not strenuously opposed by the automobile manufacturers." supported CAFE standards (relative to the gas guzzler tax) was the two groups factored in the history of postponing the implementation of tailpipe pollution standards when manufacturers argued they were too costly. 17 In fact, after oil prices fell in the mid-1980s, CAFE standards were relaxed because manufacturers argued they were too costly.
Unlike the price controls extended by the EPCA, and arguably unfortunately, CAFE standards continue today. The 2011 standards were 30.2 mpg for cars and 24.1 mpg for light-duty trucks and SUVs. Beginning in 2012, CAFE standards changed considerably in the sense that they are now "footprint based." That is, the standard is now vehicle specific; larger vehicles, measured by the circumference of their wheels, face a lower standard. As a result, it is difficult to know exactly how average fleet fuel economy will evolve, but the targets respectively. 18 The number of taxed vehicles was extremely low. In 1980, only 11 vehicles were subject to the tax; this increased to 12 vehicles in 1981 and 20 in 1982.
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Gas guzzler taxes remain today. The tax rates and fuel economy cut-offs have not changed since 1991. Therefore, inflation and technological progress have eroded their effective tax levels. That is, whether a vehicle is a "gas guzzler" is a relative term that depends on the the level of technology. Table 2 lists the tax levels and cut-offs that were established in 1991. The table also reports the "equivalent" tax levels and cut-offs for 2011. Specifically, I adjust the tax levels to account for inflation. I also calculate the equivalent 1991 fuel economy cutoffs by accounting for technological progress using a rate of two percent per year, which is broadly consistent with Knittel (2011) . For example, a modern-day vehicle whose fuel economy is between 21.5 mpg and 22.5 would be in the same portion of the distribution for fuel economy A number of policies were also adopted implicitly or explicitly subsidizing alternative fuels.
The Energy Tax Act of 1978, besides creating the gas guzzler taxes, also had a provision that exempted gasoline that was mixed with at least ten percent ethanol from the federal gasoline Standard, and differentiates fuels based on their lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. The RFS calls for minimum levels of a variety of "advanced" biofuels-biofuels that achieve large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions relative to gasoline. 20 Ultimately the current RFS 20 To date, however, the requirements for these advanced biofuels have been waived.
calls for 36 billion gallons of alternative fuels to be sold in 2022.
3 What happened to fuel consumption? European countries effectively smoothed the price shock by reducing fuel taxes. 21 Both of these points is illustrated in Table 3 effective, it is difficult to distinguish this from a level effect and differences in income growth.
The US and Canada had more room to reduce consumption because the fuel economy of their vehicle stock was so much lower than in other countries. Countries also varied considerably in their income growth over this time period. To control for changes in income, population density, and average year effects, I regress the log of fuel consumption on the log of population density, the log of GDP, and year-and country-fixed effects. I then normalize the residuals to their 1972 levels. These are plotted in Figure 11 . middle of the distribution. Therefore, even without accounting for the level effect, it doesn't appear as though the growth in US fuel consumption was low compared to these countries. imposing gasoline taxes, the op-ed did admit that alternatives "may give us a somewhat less efficient society-but that is not an excessive price to pay to keep it a decently just one."
The embargo led to more discussions about the merits of a gas tax. A November 10 New York Times article reports that the administration was considering a 40-cent gasoline tax ($1.61 in 2011 dollars), with the revenues refunded back to consumers. Nixon's economic 24 Cowans, Edward. "Politics, Economics and the 'Gas' Tax; News Analysis," New York Times June 2, 1973. The article discusses the political difficulties of such a tax. In particular, earmarking the revenues would cause problems and that the tax would be regressive. One noted advantage of the tax is that it would cool the economy during a time of economic boon.
advisors supported such a plan, but the Treasury Department opposed it because a refunded tax would be difficult to administer. Such a large tax appears to have been abandoned by the administration and reports from December of 1973, state that President Nixon pushed for a ten cents per gallon gasoline tax.
25 After this met resistance in Congress, the administration then floated an idea of taxing "excess" gasoline consumption. According to the plan, families would be allowed to purchase 14 gallons of gasoline tax-free for their first car and seven gallons of gasoline tax-free for the second car, but this did not appear to gain traction. 
The Ford Administration
In contrast to Nixon and despite much support within his administration, President Ford was staunchly against increasing gasoline taxes. He was not, however, against raising the price of gasoline, as he supported tariffs on foreign oil and pushed to decontrol oil prices. In November of 1974, Secretary Morton went on TV supporting a gasoline tax. The next day, the President responded by saying "I thought that others in the executive branch got the word, and I hope this word is conveyed to my good friend, the Secretary of the Interior. We are not considering an increase in the gasoline tax." 30 It is widely believed that the public support for a gas tax led to the firing of both Morton and Sawhill.
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Ford suggested that his major concerns were the regressivity of such a tax and its large incidence on rural communities. 32 But, the President also seems to have viewed the idea of taxing a product, but then refunding the revenues from that tax back to consumers, as a logical inconsistency.
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According to the Associated Press at the time, the White House was instead considering: mileage standards; tax credits for efficient cars; weight and horsepower restrictions; rationing;
and, somewhat ironically, oil tariffs that could turn into taxes on all oil production. light-duty industry only consumed 28 percent of US oil at this time, and much of the oil went to heating and electricity generation.
A December 23, 1974 New York Times article reports:
The automobile industry is moving toward favoring some form of tax on petroleum in the hope of guaranteeing an unregulated and adequate supply of gasoline for its products in the future. The industry also believes that a tax on petroleum, although it would increase gasoline prices and therefore tend to cut car sales and accelerate the trend toward smaller cars, would be less painful than some of the energy conservation measures being considered by Congress and the Ford Administration.
While conventional wisdom, today, seems to be that CAFE standards were favored by US automobile manufacturers at the time, it isn't clear. The same article goes on to say:
Elliott M. Estes, the president of the General Motors Corporation, for example, said in a recent interview that he would favor a tax on imported petroleum, which would lead to higher gasoline prices, rather than further Government regulations to improve fuel economy on cars.
He was referring to legislation now before Congress that would put high taxes on heavy cars or require car makers to improve fuel economy by 50 per cent by 1980.
Henry Ford II also adjusted his position by stating that "another way to accomplish these goals would be to level a general excise tax on petroleum. This might be more effective and equitable and it would certainly generate more revenue." The same article says that Chrysler and AMC were expected to also support an excise tax, as well as eliminating price controls on "old oil."
Another key group of stakeholders were farmers. While there is some indication that farmers opposed an increase in the gasoline tax (e.g., Mills' speech discussed above), their opposition does not seem to be particularly vocal. Newspaper searches in Google's New
Archive for "gas tax and farmer/farming/farm" are few. In addition, it is difficult to separate out the farmer effect from the low income effect.
The oil industry does not appear to have been very vocal regarding gasoline or oil taxes, at least publicly. The oil industry was often vilified by the public and many policy makers expressed concerns about windfall profits for domestic oil producers resulting from changes in the world price for oil. 44 Therefore, they may have consciously tried to stay out of public forums. There is also evidence that the threat of further regulation put pressure on oil companies, notably large oil companies, to keep prices for refined products down. (See, Erfle, Pound and Kalt (1981) and Erfle and McMillan (1990) .)
Consumers seemed to have been the biggest opponents of gasoline taxes. Polling at the time suggested that the public supported gas taxes only under certain, and unrealistic, circumstances.
A Harris Survey asked 1,525 households a series of questions varying the size of the tax, its impact on oil imports and the use of the revenue. Table 4 summarizes the results. The poll asked consumers if they would support a ten-or 20-cent tax increase without any other conditions. Consumers overwhelmingly opposed such a tax. Support increased if either consumers received an income tax credit for the gasoline taxes or the ten-cent tax meant the US would no longer import oil from the Middle East. 45 Only if consumers were able to write-off tax payments and a ten-cent tax would lead the US to be independent of Middle East oil did a slight majority of those polled support a tax. Consumers appeared to have preferred other, less efficient, ways to reduce consumption.
When asked whether they would prefer a tax on gasoline or a tax on large inefficient cars in order to limit gasoline consumption, 70 percent of those survey by ORC Public Opinion Index in December of 1974 preferred a tax on large cars; only 13 percent favored a tax on gasoline.
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Consumers also preferred rationing over increases in fuel prices. When asked whether 45 The exact question was: "Would you favor or oppose a ten-cent-a-gallon increase in the federal tax on gasoline if people received a tax credit on those taxes that they paid in their next year's income tax?" 46 604 telephone interviews were made. The exact question was: "In order to limit the use of gasoline by large cars or engines that get low gas mileage, which do you think would be better-a tax on gasoline or an extra tax on these large cars at the time of purchase?" ORC Public Opinion Index, Dec, 1974 . Retrieved Dec-19-2012 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. they would prefer the country to conserve oil through mandatory gasoline rationing on an odd-even basis or an 11-cent increase in gasoline prices as a result of an import tariff on oil, 60 percent of consumers preferred rationing, 25 percent preferred the tariff, with 15 percent were undecided. This is a common theme. A similar survey in January of 1975 asked consumers if they prefer Ford's oil tariff (projected to increase gasoline prices by 11 cents) to a nationwide rationing program with the understanding that consumers would not get all of the gasoline they needed. 61 percent of those surveyed preferred rationing.
47 A January 1974 New York
Times article said the Federal Energy Office was receiving over 2,000 letters and telegrams a day on how to solve the energy crisis. About 90 percent of the letters preferred rationing.
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Labor unions were also against gasoline taxes. On November 24, 1973, in response to George P. Shultz, Nixon's Secretary of Treasury, arguing in favor a gasoline tax, the AFL-CIO asked Congress to block the Nixon administration from increasing gasoline taxes. an additional five cents would be added to the tax. The entire tax was capped at 50 cents.
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The revenues from the tax would be given back to consumers in the way of tax credits on a 47 The exact question was: "There has been quite a lot of controversy regarding some of the President's (Ford's) recommendations on the economy and the energy situation. Which plan do you personally favor for cutting down on gasoline usage: President Ford's plan to impose taxes that would result in higher gasoline prices, or a nationwide rationing program, even if it meant you couldn't get all of the gasoline you needed?" Survey by Time. per capita basis.
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Carter's proposal also called for replacing price controls on crude oil with a tax equal to the difference between the price control and the world price. Again, one of, if not the, main motivation behind price controls for domestic oil was concerns that allowing domestic supplies to get the market price would result in windfall profits for oil companies. A tax equal to the price differences also accomplished this, but because gasoline prices were based on average acquisition costs, Carter's plan would increase gasoline prices (and shift rents away from refiners). According to the plan, all domestic prices would increase to the "new" oil price of $11.28 a barrel (in nominal dollars), in 1979, and old oil would be taxed the difference between the current price control ($2.25 per barrel) and $11.28. Domestic oil prices for existing resources would continue to be subject to price controls of $2.25 and $11.28 per barrel for oil and new oil. Newly discovered oil would be allowed to move to the market price over a three-year period. New oil was defined as a well farther than 2.5 miles away from an existing well or 1000 feet deeper than an existing well if it is within the 2.5 mile radius. higher gasoline prices by a 62 to 32 margin and higher oil prices by a 53 to 37 margin. The survey also found that blue-collar families were less likely to favor gas taxes than white-collar families. Similar to the current debate about climate change, one source of the lack of support for taxes was that not everyone was convinced that an energy crisis existed. Small-car-driving respondents agreed with Carter on the severity of the energy crisis by a 56 to 38 margin, but only 38 percent of large-car-driving respondents agreed.
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On June 9, 1977, the Ways and Means Committee voted 27 to ten against Carter's "standby" tax. It also voted 25 to 11 against a three-cent tax with the revenues financing public transportation. 59 There seemed to have been some optimism for the passage of the three-cent tax, but members noted that the plan also called for oil taxes that would increase gasoline prices (these were ultimately not adopted, however). 60 There were a few attempts to revive the gasoline tax over the next few months, but nothing came of them. Ultimately, there was a tax placed on industrial oil use in cases where coal was an option, but no taxes that would affect gasoline prices. Once again the regressivity of the tax was cited. Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Arkansas, was quoted as saying, "It's an elitist policy that says, 'the rich will ride and the poor will walk.' " Others seemed to suggest that they may have supported the tariff if the revenues were used to lower other taxes. Senator Sam Nunn, D-Georgia, who initially voted against the legislation blocking it, but then voted to override the veto, cited no assurances from the White House that they would lower other taxes as the reason for his change of heart.
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Polling evidence from the time suggests that Congress was voting with the will of the people; consumers continued to favor rationing over both gasoline taxes or allowing prices to clear the market. A 1977 Cambridge Reports/Research International survey of 1,500
people found that 65 percent of people preferred rationing over allowing prices to adjust to $2 (nominal prices were roughly 60 cents) as a way of reducing a 25 percent shortage in gasoline;
only 15 percent preferred the market outcome. 68 This was a steep increase from current prices of roughly 60 cents; but, the $2 focal point does not appear to have driven these results. In
April of 1978, the Gallup Organization conducted a poll asking: "If the consumption of oil and gas is reduced in the United States, which of these two ways would you prefer as a way to achieve this: start a rationing program that would require drivers to reduce the miles they drive by about one-fourth, or raise the tax on gasoline so that a gallon will cost 25 cents more than it currently does?" 55 percent of those polled favored rationing, while only 25 percent favored allowing prices to increase by 25 cents.
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Just prior to the long gasoline lines that occurred in the summer of 1979, the LA Times conducted a survey asking whether higher prices or rationing are the answer to oil and gasoline shortages. 70 42 percent of those polled preferred rationing, with 18 percent preferring "some 67 When Carter imposed the tariffs he said that he would keep the revenues in reserve as a "margin of safety." New York Times, March 15, 1980.
68 The exact question was: "Some energy experts say that our nation has to cut its gasoline usage by 25%. To do this we could either have rationing-in which case you would get three quarters of gasoline you now useor we could raise gasoline cost $2 per gallon, consumption would go down 25%. Which would you prefer if you had to choose one or the other-rationing where you would get three-quarters of what you use now or gasoline at a price of $2 per gallon?" Cambridge Reports/National Omnibus Survey, Oct, 1977 . Retrieved Dec-20-2012 70 The exact question was: "President Carter has announced that he will soon begin to remove price controls from crude oil produced in the United States in order to stimulate oil exploration and to force people to use less oil and gas. Do you think higher prices are the answer to oil and gas shortages, 
Conclusions
The oil crises of the 1970s led to a number of policies. Some of these-price controls and rationing programs-no longer exist. Other, such as CAFE standards, gas guzzler taxes, and alternative fuel mandates, continue today. The economics literature is not short of papers suggesting these policies may do more harm than good and are much less efficient than Pigouvian taxes. In this paper, I reviewed the public discussions that took place on how to or would you prefer gasoline rationing?" Los Angeles Times Poll, May, 1979 . Retrieved Dec-20-2012 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data access/ipoll/ipoll.html. 71 "60% in a Poll Back Gas Rationing," New York Times, January 7, 1980. 72 The exact wording was: "Some energy experts say that our nation has to cut its gasoline usage by 25%. To do this, we could either have rationing-in which case you would get three-quarters of the gasoline you now use-or we could raise gasoline prices enough to discourage consumption. Experts think if gasoline prices rose to $2 per gallon, consumption would go down 25%. Which would you prefer if you had to choose one or the other-rationing, where you would get three-quarters of what you use now, or gasoline at a price of $2 per gallon?" address high oil prices. Gasoline taxes were frequently discussed, even moreso than today. Figure 12 shows that the number of New York Times articles containing the phrases "gasoline tax" was much lower during the 2008 run up in gasoline prices, compared to those increases of the 1970s.
While gasoline taxes, and allowing prices to be decontrolled, appear to have been on the table and actively discussed as an alternative to price controls, CAFE standards, and gas guzzler taxes, public support for the efficient policy was lacking.
A frequent argument for why CAFE standards and alternative fuel mandates exist is that these policies hide their true cost. This argument is difficult to reconcile with the public's support for similarly inefficient policies such as price-controls-plus-rationing and gas guzzler taxes. The costs associated with price-controls-plus-rationing and gas guzzler taxes are certainly salient. Consumers at the time had experienced rationing and long gasoline lines so would have understood the costs of these policies. Consumers also understood that prices for fuel inefficient vehicles would increase under gas guzzler taxes. What can explain the support? I don't purport to answer this question. Perhaps, economists have overstated the value of people's time, or understate the psychic costs associated with the regressivity of high energy prices. Admittedly, this runs counter to the results in Deacon and Sonstelie (1985) that find when faced with a choice of a zero queue bundled with a high price for gasoline and waiting for a low price, consumers seem to reveal a value of time that is inline with their wage rates. 
Figures and Tables

